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TO REMOVE OR NOT TO REMOVE—IS THAT THE QUESTION IN 1933
ACT SECURITIES CASES?
Tanya Pierce*
Litigants spend immense time and money fighting over procedure. That
fact is especially true for procedural rules concerning where a case may be
heard—which, in the context of class actions, can determine the viability of
claims almost regardless of their underlying merit. The potential for class
certification, which tends to be greater in state than in federal courts, can
transform claims that alone are too small to even justify suing into threats so
large that defendants routinely use the words “judicial blackmail” to
describe them. This paper focuses on a growing conflict between federal
statutory removal provisions that arises in alleged class actions involving the
initial sale of securities, like cryptocurrencies, that are not sold on public
exchanges. In this category of cases, the Securities Act of 1933 strictly
prohibits removal to federal courts, while the Class Action Fairness Act
appears to broadly allow it. Thus, courts have determined the two statutes
are “irreconcilable.”
This article disagrees with the growing trend to hold CAFA prevails and
allows removal, but it first pushes back against the conclusion that the two
statutes must be irreconcilable. It illustrates how CAFA could be read to
exclude cases alleging claims solely under the 1933 Act, which would avoid
the potential for conflict altogether. It then analyzes, in the alternative, why
the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Cyan Inc. v. Beaver County
Employees Retirement Fund1 suggests that the 1933 Act should prevail. After
Cyan, filings of securities class actions have increased dramatically,
meaning understanding the interplay between these two statutes will become
increasingly important.

* I would like to thank the participants at the Inaugural Workshop for Asian American Women
in the Legal Academy (especially Ming Chen, Monika Ehrman, Suzanne Kim, and Huyen Pham)
for their valuable feedback on this article. I would also like to thank faculty members at Louisiana
State University School of Law and the Texas A&M University School of Law who provided
valuable feedback on the development of this article. I’m also grateful to Saurabh Vishnubhakat for
his insightful, detailed comments on a later draft of the article.
1 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018).
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INTRODUCTION
As a practical matter, “procedure is power.”2 Were that fact not true,
litigants would not spend enormous time and expense fighting over
procedure. But they do.3 Procedural rules—especially those involving
whether certain aggregate litigation tools are available and whether courts
have authority to hear a case—can enable plaintiffs to sue who would not
otherwise be able to, and such choices can drive settlements, even where
defendants think a case lacks merit.4 These forces are especially amplified in
class actions, where plaintiffs often lack means to sue individually, but where
together, the potential for outsized damages can impose enormous pressure
on a defendant to settle. This paper focuses on a narrow but important
procedural question that arises in the context of class action litigation
involving the sale of securities that are not sold on public exchanges. These
kinds of securities include cryptocurrencies, which are increasingly the

2 Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1442 (2008).
3 Cf. Rory Ryan, It’s Just Not Worth Searching for Welcome Mats with a Kaleidoscope and a
Broken Compass, 75 TENN. L. REV. 659, 679–82 (2008) (using empirical data to illustrate the high
cost and long delays associated with litigating federal question removal under the Grable text).
4 Burbank, supra note 2 at 1442; see also, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a
World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1839, 1861 (2006).
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subject of public offerings, and mortgage-backed securities, which were at
the center of the 2008 recession.
Over the past several decades, Congress has attempted to curb or
eliminate the use of the class action device in securities cases and in other
types of litigation.5 Specific to securities, in the 1990s, Congress passed two
statutes specifically in response to concerns surrounding the use of the class
action device in these kinds of cases.6 And more generally applicable to all
of the nation’s largest class actions, in 2005, Congress passed the Class
Action Fairness Act7 to avoid what it perceived as state courts’ eagerness to
certify class actions, without subjecting them to the kind of careful scrutiny
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires.8
Unfortunately, a conflict has developed between the non-removal
provision, Section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,9 and the jurisdiction
and removal provisions in CAFA.10 While both statutes provide for
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, somewhat unusually, the 1933 Act
contains an anti-removal provision.11 That provision prevents defendants
from removing certain cases to federal courts if plaintiffs choose to file them
in state courts.12 In contrast, CAFA, which amended the general diversity
jurisdiction statute—28 U.S.C. § 1332—contains generous removal
provisions.13 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has declared that
CAFA’s removal provisions should be applied liberally, without any
presumption against removal.14 In the category of cases to which both statutes

5 See

Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066–67 (2018) (discussing
the history of congressional attempts to curb securities class action litigation).
6 Id.
7 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)) (significantly expanding federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction over
class actions).
8 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2517, 2525 (2008).
9 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
10 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1332(d), 1453).
11 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
12 Id.
13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); 28 U.S.C. § 1453.
14 Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct 547, 554 (2014) (citing Standard
Fire Ins. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (2013) (quoting S. Rep. 109-14, at 43 (2005))).
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arguably apply, courts thus far have agreed the 1933 Act and CAFA
conflict.15
In the last few years, filings of securities class actions have increased
dramatically, with 1933 Act filings reaching “unprecedented levels” in recent
years.16 Questions about whether CAFA applies at all in these cases, and, if
so, whether Section 22(a)’s removal ban or CAFA’s liberal removal
provisions should prevail are likely to continue occurring with increasing
frequency.
This article attempts to bring clarity to the confusing question of which
statute’s removal provision should apply, largely by illustrating the two
statutes do not have to be interpreted in a way that creates the conflict.
Instead, CAFA contains a specific exemption that could be interpreted to
exempt from CAFA’s reach cases that allege certain kinds of claims solely
under the 1933 Act. Interpreting this CAFA exemption in this way would
eliminate CAFA’s jurisdiction and removal provisions from the calculous
altogether. Thus, providing a clear answer: only the 1933 Act’s non-removal
provision would apply.

I.

SUMMARIZING RELEVANT STATUTES

As necessary context, one must consider the statutory framework in
which the relevant securities statutes and CAFA are situated. One must also
understand some of the ways in which Congress specifically attempted to
limit the availability of the class action device in securities-related litigation
as context for analyzing whether Congress intended to also affect the reach
of the 1933 Act’s non-removal provision when it passed CAFA. An adequate
understanding of these statutes and their relevant provisions allows one to
identify the category of cases that arguably implicate both statutes’
provisions concerning removal. Thus, before the next section that explains
how the statutes can and should be reconciled to avoid the conflict and in the
15 Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 533 F.3d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008);
Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 2008).
16 Securities Class Actions filings—2019 Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RSCH., 1, (comparing
average annual class action filings from 1997–2018 of 215 with 2019’s class action filings of 428)
available at https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings2019-Year-in-Review (last visited Nov. 17, 2021). Filings in the first half of 2020 dropped
somewhat. Securities Class Actions Filings—2020 Mid-Year Assessment, CORNERSTONE RSCH.,
14, available at https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/2020-Securities-Class-ActionFilings-2020-Midyear-Assessment. But given the COVID-19 crisis, many businesses, law offices,
and courts were closed for months.
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alternative which statute should prevail and why, this section first highlights
Congress’s initial creation of private rights of action in the 1930s related to
securities transactions and summarizes the provisions of the 1933 Act that
are relevant to understanding their interplay with certain provisions of
CAFA. The section then briefly outlines Congress’s two specific legislative
attempts in the 1990s to curtail perceived abuses of the class action device by
plaintiffs in certain kinds of securities cases. Finally, it describes Congress’s
passage of CAFA, largely in response to state courts’ certifications of large,
nationwide consumer class actions that CAFA’s proponents argued exploited
the use of the class action device without adequately subjecting certification
decisions to the kind of scrutiny they would be subjected to if the cases were
pending in federal courts that would have to apply Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23’s requirements.

A. The 1933 Act and Other Relevant Securities Statutes
Responding to the stock market crash of 1929, Congress sought “to
promote honest practices in the securities markets,” so it passed two laws—
the 1933 Act and the Securities Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act).17 The
fundamental purpose underlying these acts was “to eliminate serious abuses
in a largely unregulated securities market.”18 Congress recognized the
“virtually limitless scope of human ingenuity, especially in the creation of
‘countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek to use the money
of others on the promise of profits.’”19 Thus, in both acts, Congress defined
the term “security” broadly such that the term encompasses “virtually any
instrument that might be sold as an investment.”20 The 1933 Act covers the
original issuance of securities, requiring, among other things, that companies

17 Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018). For a description
of market forces and how the “ebb and flow” of the market has influenced the securities legislation
from the stock market crash of 1929 through the 2008 financial crisis precipitated by the housing
market and subprime mortgages, see Denise Mazzeo, Note, Securities Class Actions, CAFA, and a
Countrywide Crisis: A Call for Clarity and Consistency, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1433, 1433 (2009)
(proposing removal be allowed under CAFA for securities cases “that are of real national
importance”).
18 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60 (1990) (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975)).
19 Reves, 494 U.S. at 60–61 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946)).
20 Reves, 494 U.S. at 61 (interpreting term “security” in 1933 and 1934 Acts to include a demand
note issued by a farmers’ co-op and outlining standards used to determine whether an instrument
qualifies as a security) (citing United Hous. Found., Inc., 421 U.S. at 847 n.12).
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that sell securities to the public “make ‘full and fair disclosure’ of relevant
information.”21 To enforce the obligations created by the Act, Congress
included within it private rights of action to enforce those obligations.22
The 1933 Act authorizes concurrent state and federal court subject matter
jurisdiction over claims that arise under it.23 Thus, plaintiffs have a choice
and can choose to seek redress by filing in either state court or in federal
court. Somewhat unusually, however, Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act
specifically provides that if plaintiffs choose to file 1933 Act cases in state
courts, defendants may not remove those cases to federal courts.24 As
originally enacted, Section 22(a) provided, “No case arising under this
subchapter and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be
removed to any court of the United States.”25 Thus, as originally drafted, no
exceptions applied; cases filed in state court pursuant to the 1933 Act stayed
there due to Section 22(a). In 2018, describing Section 22(a) as that provision
was originally enacted, the Supreme Court explained, “So if a plaintiff chose
to bring a 1933 Act suit in state court, the defendant could not change the
forum.”26 As explained below, in the 1990s, Congress amended Section 22(a)
when it passed one of the statutes aimed at reforming class actions involving
publicly traded securities, but it did not similarly amend Section 22(a) when
it passed CAFA.27
A year after passing the 1933 Act, Congress passed another securities
statute: the 1934 Act. While the 1933 Act regulates the original issuance of

21 Cyan,

138 S. Ct. at 1066 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 646 (1988)).

22 Id.
23 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1066 (citing § 22(a), 48 Stat. 86 (“The district courts of the United
States . . . shall have jurisdiction[,] concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity
and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title.”)); Luther v.
Countrywide Home Loans Serv. L.P., 533 F.3d 1031, 1032 (9th Cir. 2008). Recall that federal courts
have jurisdiction over only those matters permitted by the Constitution and authorized by Congress.
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
24 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1066; Luther, 533 F.3d at 1033. Although the 1933 Act’s non-removal
provision is unusual, it is not the only federal statute to contain such a provision. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
1445 (listing some types of nonremovable actions); Nielsen v. Weeks Marine Inc., 910 F. Supp. 84,
87 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (recognizing Jones Act contains removal provision providing plaintiffs the
privilege to file a claim in state court without risking removal).
25 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). SLUSA amended this provision as described infra.
26 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1066.
27 See infra.
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securities, the 1934 Act regulates any subsequent trading of securities.28 Like
the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act’s obligations can be enforced through private
rights of action.29 But unlike the 1933 Act’s authorization of concurrent
federal and state court jurisdiction, the 1934 Act provides exclusive federal
court jurisdiction over suits filed pursuant to the 1934 Act.30 Thus, while the
1933 Act allows plaintiffs to file claims in state courts, and if they do,
prohibits removal of those cases to federal courts, the 1934 Act does not
allow plaintiffs to file claims in state courts and does not allow those cases to
proceed in state courts.31
By the mid-1990s, many argued plaintiffs were abusing the class-action
vehicle in various kinds of securities cases.32 And, after the 1994
congressional elections, the securities and accounting industries, in
particular, gained leverage in Congress and lobbied for reform.33 In response
to pressure from these and other groups, Congress passed two additional
securities-specific statutes. First, it enacted the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (the Reform Act).34 The Reform Act amended the 1933
and 1934 Acts in several ways in an attempt to thwart the alleged abuses by
class action plaintiffs and their lawyers.35
But the Reform Act proved to be less effective than its proponents had
hoped because some of the Reform Act’s provisions apply only to cases
pending in federal courts and not to cases pending in state courts.36 For
example, when plaintiffs file a class action in federal court, the Reform Act
requires the lead plaintiff’s attorney to swear that he or she has not directed
the lead plaintiff to purchase the security at issue.37 In addition, when a case

28 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1066 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752
(1975)).
29 Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730, n.4).
30 Id. (citing § 27, 48 Stat. 902–03).
31 Id.
32 Id. (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)).
33 Matthew O’Brien, Choice of Forum in Securities Class Actions: Confronting “Reform” of
the Securities Act of 1933, 28 REV. LITIG. 845, 857 (citing Richard W. Painter, Responding to a
False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 32 (1998)).
34 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
35 Id.; Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes
During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2006).
36 Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066–67 (2018).
37 Id. at 1067.
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is pending in federal court, the Reform Act provides strict sanctions designed
to discourage attorneys from bringing frivolous claims.38
To circumvent these and other requirements of the Reform Act that
targeted securities cases, knowledgeable plaintiffs’ attorneys avoided federal
courts.39 During this time period, after the Reform Act was passed but before
Congress addressed the weaknesses in the Reform Act and its later attempt
through CAFA to limit the availability of nationwide class actions more
generally, the law provided opportunities for plaintiffs to keep class actions
in state rather than in federal courts.40 They could file securities class actions
in state courts based on the 1933 Act, which according to Section 22(a) could
not be removed to federal court.41
Or they could file class action claims based solely on state laws, rather
than pursuing those claims under the 1934 Act.42 These securities claims
based on state laws did not provide for jurisdiction under the federal question
jurisdiction statute.43 In addition, the plaintiffs in an alleged nationwide class
action could avoid federal court jurisdiction under the diversity statute by
suing a defendant who shared citizenship with one of the plaintiffs, assuming
the joinder was not fraudulent or by alleging individual damages that did not
exceed the $75,000, exclusive of costs and interests.44 Because federal courts
are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction,45 plaintiffs could avoid a
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c) (mandating review to determine whether attorneys complied with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and mandating sanctions upon finding violations of that rule); 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(c) (mandating review and sanctions similar to 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c)).
39 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1067 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547
U.S. 71, 82 (2006)).
40 Id.
41 See O’Brien, supra note 33, at 858–59 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) and Jeffrey T. Cook,
Recrafting the Framework of Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM.
U. L. REV. 621, 624 (2006)).
42 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1062.
43 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Sissom v. Countrywide Homes Loans, Inc., 772 F. Appx. 75, 76 (5th
Cir. 2019) (mem. op.) (holding that “there is generally no federal jurisdiction if the plaintiff pleads
only a state law cause of action” unless “the complaint itself states a substantial federal claim”)
(citing MSOF Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 295 F.3d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2002); and Maroney v. Univ.
Interscholastic League, 764 F.2d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 1985)).
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in
Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1450–51 (2008) (citing Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005)).
45 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also, e.g., Tanya
Pierce, Dueling Grants: Reimagining CAFA’s Jurisdictional Provisions, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 723,
727–28 (2017).
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federal forum through carefully pleading claims, deliberately suing nondiverse parties, or limiting the alleged amount-in-controversy. By carefully
crafting their complaints to avoid the original jurisdiction of federal courts
and filing those complaints in state courts, plaintiffs increasingly succeeded
in avoiding the reach of the Reform Act.46 In response, defendants
increasingly argued plaintiffs were exploiting “loopholes” in the Reform Act
that allowed plaintiffs to continue pursuing securities class actions freely,
despite the Reform Act’s attempts to reign in the use of the class action device
in securities cases.47
In response to these perceived shortcomings in the Reform Act, in 1998,
just three years after passing the Reform Act, Congress passed yet another
securities-specific statute aimed at curbing the use of class actions in
securities cases: the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA).48
Like the Reform Act before it, SLUSA attempted to circumvent plaintiffs’
use of the class action device in certain kinds of securities-related cases.49
Among other things, SLUSA targeted plaintiffs’ ability to allege claims
based solely on state law and avoid pleading any bases for federal question
jurisdiction, thus avoiding the reach of the Reform Act.
SLUSA also targeted plaintiffs’ ability to rely on Section 22(a) of the
1933 Act as a sure-fire way to avoid removal to federal court. By specifically
prohibiting plaintiffs from pursuing as class actions certain kinds of securities
cases that allege misrepresentations or omissions of material fact or
fraudulent activity connected to the purchase or sale of certain kinds of
securities, SLUSA reaches many of the types of claims that plaintiffs bring
under the 1933 Act. And prior to SLUSA’s enactment, all claims brought

46 Cyan,

138 S. Ct. at 1067.
O’Brien, supra note 33, at 859 (illustrating that the “extent to which plaintiffs took
advantage of these loopholes in uncertain”); see also Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism:
Preempting Private Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 274 (1998)
(describing the shift from filings in federal courts to state courts as “unintended” and a “by-product”
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act); Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in
State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 349, 351 (2011) (discussing same).
48 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
49 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1067. Legislative history further suggests SLUSA’s purpose was to
provide a uniform, country-wide approach to litigation involving nationally traded securities. S.
Rep. No. 105-182, at 3 (1988); see also Denise Mazzeo, supra note 17, at 1436–38 (arguing that
market forces influence the level of investor protections, or lack thereof, in securities laws).
47 See
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solely under the 1933 Act were subject to Section 22(a)’s prohibition against
removal to federal court.50
Broadly speaking, SLUSA prohibits plaintiffs from bringing “covered
class actions” concerning “covered securities.”51 The term “covered class
action” means a putative class action that involves common questions of law
or fact brought on behalf of more than fifty persons.52 The term “covered
security” means a security that is traded on a national exchange, such as the
New York Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ, or the American Stock
Exchange.53
To give effect to SLUSA’s prohibition against the use of the class action
device in class actions involving fifty or more class members and claims
concerning securities traded on a national exchange, Congress needed to
prevent plaintiffs from avoiding SLUSA’s reach in the ways that plaintiffs
had learned to avoid the Reform Act’s reach. In SLUSA, therefore, Congress
provided an avenue for defendants to remove cases covered by SLUSA to
federal court, even if plaintiffs alleged only state-law-based securities claims
and even if plaintiffs alleged only claims under the 1933 Act.
Especially relevant to analyzing Section 22(a)’s interaction with CAFA’s
removal provision, one should note that in SLUSA, Congress amended
Section 22(a) by removing the section’s prohibition against removal for
covered class actions involving securities traded on national exchanges.54
Thus, SLUSA amended Section 22(a), which after SLUSA’s amendment
reads: “Except as provided in section 77p of this title, no case arising under
this subchapter and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall
be removed to any court of the United States.”55 The cross-referenced section
in amended Section 22(a) is Section 77p, which provides “covered class

50 Cyan,

138 S. Ct. at 1066–67.
U.S.C. § 78bb(f).
52 Id. A covered class action is one that involves common questions of law or fact brought on
behalf of more than fifty persons.
53 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c); 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (listing definitions).
54 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b). After SLUSA’s passage, the 1933 Act’s jurisdictional grant in § 77b(a)
reads as follows:
51 15

The district courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction[,] concurrent with State
and Territorial courts, except as provided in section 77p of this title with respect to
covered class actions, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this subchapter. (emphasis added).
55 Cyan,

138 S. Ct. at 1068 (emphasis in original); 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
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actions” (those filed on behalf of more than fifty persons) can be removed to
federal court if the alleged class concerns a “covered security” (those traded
on a national exchange).56 Once these cases are removed, SLUSA instructs
federal courts to dismiss them, thus giving effect to SLUSA’s prohibition
against using the class action device in “covered class actions” involving
“covered securities.”57
In light of SLUSA’s passage, plaintiffs cannot pursue as class actions any
sizable cases alleging claims solely under the 1933 Act if those claims
involve covered securities traded on national exchanges. But SLUSA did not
address non-covered securities that are not publicly traded on national stock
exchanges. And recall that securities are defined broadly to include many
types of instruments that might be sold as an investment, including, for
example,
debt-backed
securities,
mortgage-backed
securities,
cryptocurrencies, and others.58 Class actions involving the initial sale or
offerings of these non-covered securities are still covered by Section 22(a)’s
prohibition.59
While courts generally agreed that SLUSA removal and dismissal applied
to all securities-related class actions concerning covered securities, the statute
is not well written, and, as a result, over time, a split developed concerning
whether SLUSA divested state courts of subject matter jurisdiction over class
actions brought solely pursuant to the 1933 Act.60 The Ninth Circuit Court of

56 Cyan,

138 S. Ct. at 1067 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(3) and cross-referencing § 77r(b)).
U.S.C. § 77p(c).
58 In the cryptocurrency industry, the initial public offering is an initial coin offering. See
Jake Frankenfield, Cryptocurrency: Initial Coin Offering (ICO), INVESTOPEDIA (November 3,
2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/initial-coin-offering-ico.asp; see also Investor
Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (July 25 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings (explaining that depending
on the offering, individual tokens or coins may qualify as securities subject to the securities laws);
Coffey v. Ripple Labs Inc., 333 F. Supp. 3d 952, 955–56 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Reves v. Ernst & Young,
494 U.S. 56, 60–61 (1990) (interpreting term “security” broadly to include demand note issued by
farmers co-op); see also Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. v. Bezich, 610 F.3d 448, 450 (7th Cir. 2010)
(recognizing “a ‘security’ includes an interest in something that gives the holder the right to
purchase a security”).
59 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1069, 1075.
60 Id. at 1068–69 n.1 (comparing Luther v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 195 Cal. App. 4th 789,
797–98, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 721 (2011) (holding continued state court jurisdiction) with Knox
v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), abrogated by Cyan, 138 S. Ct. 1061
(2018) (holding no state court jurisdiction); see also Richard K. Neumann Jr., Why Congress Drafts
Gibberish, 16 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 111, 111–14 (2019) (describing SLUSA, in
57 15
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Appeals held SLUSA did not divest state courts of concurrent jurisdiction,
while courts in the Second Circuit held the opposite.61 And, although that
split is not the subject of this article, the Supreme Court’s resolution in the
Cyan v. Beaver County case in favor of Section 22(a) provides insight into
how this section should interact with CAFA’s removal provisions. Before
delving into those insights, however, a brief explanation of CAFA’s relevant
provisions is necessary.

B. CAFA’s Jurisdiction and Removal Provisions
Like the 1933 Act that authorizes concurrent jurisdiction in state and
federal courts over securities cases that meet its requirements, CAFA
authorizes concurrent jurisdiction in federal and state courts over class
actions that meet CAFA’s requirements as long as the class actions do not
fall within CAFA’s carve-outs or exceptions.62 In this way, both statutes’
grants of jurisdiction are consistent with the “deeply rooted presumption in
favor of concurrent” state and federal court jurisdiction.63 Unless a statute
explicitly calls for exclusive jurisdiction, the statute’s legislative history is
unmistakable in requiring it, or there exists a “clear incompatibility between
state-court jurisdiction and federal interests,” courts interpret jurisdictional
grants as incorporating concurrent subject matter jurisdiction.64
Similar to the motivation underlying the passage of the securities-specific
Reform Act and SLUSA in the 1990s, Congress’s passage of CAFA in 2005
has been described as a response to perceived abuses of the class action
system and as an attempt to “address some of the most egregious problems

response to oral argument in Cyan, as “a statute so complicated that neither the [Supreme Court]
justices nor the lawyers arguing the case could really understand it”).
61 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1068–69 (comparing Luther, 195 Cal. App. 4th 789, 797–98, 125
Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 721 (2011) with Knox, 613 F. Supp. 2d 419, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), abrogated by
Cyan, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018)).
62 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) with Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459–60 (1990)
(recognizing a “deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent” state court jurisdiction unless the
statute explicitly calls for exclusive jurisdiction, the legislative history is unmistakable in requiring
it, or a “‘clear incompatibility’ exists between state court jurisdiction and federal interests”). That
concurrent jurisdiction is intended is also evidenced by CAFA’s provisions providing federal courts
discretion to decline hearing certain kinds of class actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3).
63 Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 459–60.
64 Id.
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in class action practice.”65 Before CAFA’s enactment, federal courts rarely
had jurisdiction over large, nationwide class actions that were based on state
rather than federal law.66 Unless the underlying claims implicated federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, federal courts generally lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.67 The general diversity statute nearly never
provided jurisdiction because in nationwide class actions, the alleged class
presumably would include members domiciled in every state, thus defeating
the traditional requirement of complete diversity.68
Thus, there existed a perception that unscrupulous lawyers were filing
lawsuits for their own personal gains and choosing to file in state courts that
were “lax about following the strict requirements of Rule 23.”69 The lack of
an available federal forum for most consumer class actions, proponents
argued, allowed plaintiffs “unbounded leverage,” forced defendants to pay
“ransom” settlements, and encouraged “blatant forum shopping.”70 Thus,
CAFA’s supporters, on the one hand, argued that large class actions should
be decided by federal courts that would more carefully weigh certification
decisions independent of the potential merits of underlying claims, which
might otherwise improperly influence those decisions.71 CAFA’s detractors,
on the other hand, argued CAFA symbolized an attempt to preempt state class
65 S. Rep. 109-14, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3; G. Shaun Richardson, Class Dismissed, Now
What? Exploring the Exercise of CAFA Jurisdiction After the Denial of Class Certification, 39 N.M.
L. REV. 121, 125 n.30 (2009) (citing Pub. L. No. 109-2 § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (“The purposes
of this Act are to . . . restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by providing
for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity
jurisdiction.”)). But see Arthur R. Miller, What Are Courts For? Have We Forsaken the Procedural
Gold Standard?, 78 LA. L. REV. 739, 760–61 (aptly describing the title of the Class Action Fairness
Act as “a misnomer if ever there was one” and the Act’s passage as being the result of a more
conservative Congress responding to business interests and corporate and defense groups).
66 Compare, e.g., the general diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which requires complete
diversity of citizenship, with CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), which requires only minimal diversity.
67 Tanya Pierce, It’s not Over ‘til It’s Over: Mandating Federal Pretrial Jurisdiction and
Oversight in Mass Torts, 79 MO. L. REV. 27, 38 (2014).
68 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1807) (requiring complete diversity of
citizenship for jurisdiction to exist under § 1332); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1451
(2008).
69 S. Rep. 109-14, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14–15.
70 MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 12:6 (17th ed.) (citing S. Rep. No. 108-123, at 15,
18, 21 (2003); S. Rep. No. 108-144, at 12 (2003); 151 Cong. Rec. H729 (Feb. 17, 2005)).
71 Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 165 (citing S. Rep. 109-14, 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6, 7) (quoting Senator Arlen Spector).
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actions to benefit “corporate behemoths” at the expense of the country’s most
vulnerable citizens’ rights to seek redress through the courts for corporate
wrongdoings.72 Despite these conflicting views, courts have recognized
Congress’s intent, in part, was to “‘restore the intent of the framers of the
United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of
interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction.’”73
CAFA attempted to do so by effectively federalizing the nation’s largest
class actions, with certain exceptions.74 CAFA thus allows federal courts to
hear most of the nation’s largest multi-state class actions, even those based
solely on state law.75 To implicate subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA,
an alleged class must involve at least 100 members, the alleged amount in
controversy in the aggregate must exceed $5 million, the citizenship of the
plaintiffs and defendants must be at least “minimally diverse,” and none of
CAFA’s carve-outs or CAFA’s exceptions can apply.76

72 Id. at 164 n.4 (citing 151 Cong. Rec. H. 643-01, H. 644 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2005)
(statement of Rep. McGovern) (“[T]his bill . . . closes the courthouse door in the face of people who
need and deserve help . . . unduly limit[ing] the right of individuals to seek redress for corporate
wrongdoing in their state courts.”)).
73 Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Serv. L.P., 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citing Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (codified as a note to 28 U.S.C. § 1711)).
74 Id.; Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d) (significantly expanding federal courts’ jurisdiction over class actions that meet
its requirements); Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc. 592 F.3d 805, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2010);;
see also Tanya Pierce, supra note 67, at 38; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on
Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2525–26 (2008).
75 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Minimal diversity exists when the citizenship of any class member
is diverse from that of any defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(D); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483
F.3d 1184, 1194 n.24 (7th Cir. 2007). Before CAFA, federal courts would in most cases lack
jurisdiction of nationwide class actions unless the underlying cause of action were based on federal
law, implicating federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Jurisdiction under the
diversity statute nearly never existed in cases involving U.S. companies because in nationwide class
actions, the alleged class presumably would include members domiciled in every state. See
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1807) (requiring complete diversity of citizenship for
jurisdiction under § 1332).
76 The relevant jurisdictional provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) provides:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and is a class action in which—(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a
State different from any defendant; (B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign
state or a citizen or subject of a foreign sate and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
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Despite CAFA’s expansion of diversity jurisdiction to most of the
nation’s largest class actions, however, Congress incorporated into the statute
some limitations to CAFA’s reach. Such limitations include the following:
(1) CAFA carves out class actions in which “the primary defendants are
States, State officials, or other governmental entities against whom the
district court may be foreclosed from ordering relief”;77 (2) CAFA does not
apply to class actions in which the “number of members of all proposed
plaintiff classes in the aggregate is less than 100”; 78 (3) CAFA mandates
courts “shall decline to exercise jurisdiction” in some cases;79 (4) CAFA
allows courts discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction in other cases;80

any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign
state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
Section 1332(d)(9) lists CAFA’s exceptions, providing the following:
Paragraph (2) [the jurisdictional grant] shall not apply to any class action that solely
involves a claim—(A) concerning a covered security as defined under § 16(f)(3) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 78p(f)(3)) and § 28(f)(5)(E)) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(E)); (B) that relates to the internal affairs
or governance of a corporation or other form of business enterprise and that arises under
or by virtue of the laws of the State in which such corporation or business enterprise is
incorporated or organized; or (C) that relates to the rights, duties (including fiduciary
duties), and obligations related to or created by or pursuant to any security (as defined
under § 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)) and the regulations
issued thereunder).
77 28

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(A).
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
79 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) provides:
78 28

A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction . . . (A)(i) over a class action in
which—(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the
aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed; (II) at least 1
defendant is a defendant—(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the
plaintiff class; (bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims
asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and (cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the
action was originally filed; and (III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct
or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action
was originally filed; and (ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class
action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual
allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons; or (B)
two-thirds or more of the members off all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and
the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed.
80 28

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) provides:
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and (5) CAFA excludes certain types of claims from its jurisdictional grant
altogether.81
Among the kinds of cases for which CAFA excludes from its jurisdiction
are three categories of class actions involving securities and business
governance. The first category exempts class actions that solely involve a
claim concerning a “covered security” as defined by the 1933 and 1934
Acts.82 The second category exempts class actions arising under the laws of
the state in which a business is organized and related to the internal affairs or
governance of the business.83 The third category—1332(d)(9)(C)—exempts
any “class action that solely involves a claim” related to the “rights, duties
(including fiduciary duties), and obligations related to or created by or
pursuant to any security (as defined under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1)) and the regulations issued thereunder).”84
Each of these exemptions is mirrored in CAFA’s removal provisions in
Section 1453.

A district court may, in the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the
circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction . . . over a class action in which greater
than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in
the aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the State in which the action was
originally filed based on consideration of (A) whether the claims asserted involve matters
of national or interstate interest; (B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by the
laws of the State in which the action was originally filed or by the laws of other States;
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal
jurisdiction; (D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the
class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants; (E) whether the number of citizens
in the State in which the action was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the
aggregate is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other State, and the
citizenship of the other members of the proposed class is dispersed among a substantial
number of States; and (F) whether, during the 3-year prior preceding the filing of that
class action, 1 or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf
of the same or other persons have been filed.
81 28

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9). For the language of these exceptions, see supra note 76.
at § 1332(d)(9)(A) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(f)(3) and 78bb(f)(5)(E)). Under the 1933
Act, a “covered security” is a security “traded nationally or listed on a regulated national exchange.”
Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1063 (2018); Estate of Pew, 527 F.3d
at 34 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(b), 77p(f)(3), 78bb(f)(5)(E)); Owen v. Elastos Found., 438 F. Supp.
3d 187, 188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Davis v. Chase Bank U.S.A., 453 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1209 (C.D.
Cal. 2006) (holding credit card agreements, bills, and finance charges are not securities, so this
exemption does not apply to them).
83 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(b).
84 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(c).
82 Id.
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With regard to removal from state to federal court, CAFA is quite
different than the 1933 Act. Indeed, in CAFA, Congress enacted liberalized
removal rules, exempting from cases removed pursuant to CAFA many of
the traditional limitations on removals to federal court and all of the diversity
specific limitations.85 Instead, for class actions that are not subject to
mandatory abstention under the carve-outs86 or that do not fall within the
listed exclusions to CAFA’s jurisdictional grant,87 CAFA provides quite
liberal removal rules.88 Under CAFA:
A class action may be removed to a district court of the
United States in accordance with section 1446 . . . without
regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in
which the action is brought, except that such action may be
removed by any defendant without the consent of all
defendants.89
Thus, while under the general diversity statute, all defendants must join
in or consent to the removal for it to be valid, in cases removed pursuant to
CAFA, any defendant may remove a qualifying alleged class action on its
own accord.90 In addition, in other cases removed pursuant to the diversity
statute, removal is not allowed if any of the defendants are citizens of the
state in which the case is filed.91 But the existence of a home-state defendant
does not affect the availability of removal pursuant to CAFA.92 Similarly,
ordinarily, in cases removed under the diversity statute, there is a one-year
outer limit on removals in the absence of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff,
but the one-year limit does not apply to removals under CAFA.93
Finally, while ordinarily, a presumption against removal exists, the
Supreme Court in the Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens case

85 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (allowing class actions to be removed in accordance with the removal
rules in § 1446, but not applying the 1-year limitation, the home-state defendant limitation, or the
requirement that all defendants consent in the removal).
86 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4).
87 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9).
88 See 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (providing for removal of class actions irrespective of the typical
one-year limitation and without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the forum state).
89 Id.
90 See id.
91 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
92 See 28 U.S,C, § 1453.
93 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1), with 28 U.S,C, § 1453.
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categorically declared that “no anti-removal presumption attends cases
invoking CAFA,” which is a significant departure from ordinary removals,
for defendants must overcome a presumption against removal.94 In Dart
Cherokee, the Supreme Court instead announced, “CAFA’s provisions
should be read broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions
should be heard in a federal court if properly removed by any defendant.”95
And unlike traditional remand decisions in other types of cases for which
immediate appeal is not available, CAFA’s removal provisions provide
courts of appeals discretion to “accept an appeal from an order of a district
court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the State court
from which it was removed,” as long as the appeal is timely filed.96

II.

IDENTIFYING THE CONFLICT

If a court determines that both the 1933 Act and CAFA simultaneously
apply in a case, the two statutes’ removal provisions will inevitably conflict.97
The kind of cases in which both statutes could arguably apply are fairly
narrow. To implicate Section 22(a)’s prohibition against removal, plaintiffs
must allege only claims arising under the 1933 Act concerning defendants’
failure to make required disclosures in the original issuance of securities, but
not just any securities.98 The securities at issue would have to be so-called
“noncovered securities” under SLUSA, meaning the securities could not be
ones traded on any national market.99 To implicate CAFA’s jurisdiction and
removal in the same case, the plaintiffs would have to allege a large
nationwide class action that includes at least 100 putative class members, at
least minimal diversity between the plaintiffs and defendants, and aggregated
damages that exceed $5 million, exclusive of interest and costs.100

94 574

U.S. 81, 89 (2014) (citing Standard Fire Ins. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 595 (2013)).
(quoting S. Rep. 109-14, at 43 (2005)).
96 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1).
97 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (providing an express exception to removal for certain class
actions under the ‘33 Act), with 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (providing a broad right to remove class
actions).
98 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (providing for civil liability for untrue or misleading registration
statements); 15 U.S.C. § 77l (providing for civil liability for untrue or misleading prospectuses).
99 See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018) (citing
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 646 (1988)).
100 See, e.g., Owen v. Elastos Found., 438 F. Supp. 3d 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Luther
v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 533 F.3d 1031, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 2008).
95 Id.
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Even though the category of cases in which the conflict between the two
statutes can arise is narrow, the number of cases being filed is likely to grow
at an alarming rate. Indeed, since the Supreme Court decided the Cyan Inc.
v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund case,101 filings under the 1933
Act have increased a great deal.102 At the same time, offerings of securities
that are not traded on a national market have also rapidly increased, especially
in the form of initial public offerings for various kinds of cryptocurrencies.103
Thus, cases implicating the potential conflict between the two statutes
removal provision are likely to grow rapidly as well.
And in those cases, unless, as described in the next section, a court
determines that CAFA does not apply, the two statutes’ removal provisions
will contradict each other. Application of Section 22(a) would deny a
defendant the right to remove, while CAFA would simultaneously grant the
defendant the right to remove.104 Consequently, every court that has
determined both statutes applied and “considered the interplay between [the
1933 Act’s] removability bar and CAFA’s removal provision has found that
the two statutes are irreconcilable.”105 Some courts, following the Ninth
Circuit’s approach, hold the 1933 Act should prevail.106 Other courts,
following the Seventh Circuit’s approach, hold CAFA should prevail.107
Both approaches are described and critiqued below.

101 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018) (settling conflicts surrounding jurisdiction and removal in cases
in which both the 1933 Act and in the 1998 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act applied);
Johnson, supra note 47, at 349–351 (discussing same).
102 Maureen Farrell, U.S. IPO Market Reaches Record Total, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2020.
103 See Patricia Kowsmann and Caitlin Ostroff, Biggest Crypto Exchange is Everywhere
and Nowhere., WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2021.
104 The Supreme Court instructs that to determine the meaning of a statute, courts must
begin by consulting the statute’s text: “We have stated time and again that courts must presume that
a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the
words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: the judicial inquiry is
complete.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).
105 Owen, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 191 (citing Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 2009);
N. J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Harborview Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006-4, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581, 586
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. 2:07-cv-08165-MRP,
2008 WL 11339604, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008), aff’d, 533 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2008)).
106 See, e.g., Greenwald v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 18-cv-04790-PJH, 2018 WL 4961767, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2018) (“And while defendants are free to argue to the Ninth Circuit that
Luther was wrongly decided, those arguments fail to persuade this court.”).
107 See, e.g., Owen, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 190 (holding Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act must
cede to CAFA’s removal provisions).

9 PIERCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

TO REMOVE OR NOT TO REMOVE

1/18/22 10:49 PM

615

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach
As the first of the circuit courts to confront the conflict, the Ninth Circuit,
in the Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing case, held CAFA did not
supersede the 1933 Act’s prohibition against removal.108 Luther involved a
class of investors who sought compensation for alleged violations of the 1933
Act involving the acquisition of hundreds of billions of dollars of mortgage
pass-through certificates from the defendants.109 The defendants, they
alleged, issued false and misleading registration statements and prospectus
materials for the certificates, violating several sections of the 1933 Act and
causing the investments to be much riskier than represented.110 The complaint
expressly excluded and disclaimed any allegations of fraud or intentional or
reckless misconduct—claims that would not have arisen under the 1933 Act
and would have been subject to removal and dismissal under SLUSA.111
One of the defendants, Countrywide, removed the action to federal court
pursuant to CAFA.112 Relying on Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act, the named
plaintiff moved to remand the case back to state court, arguing the 1933 Act
specifically prohibited the removal of claims filed in state court arising under
the 1933 Act.113 Countrywide countered that Section 22(a)’s prohibition
against removal did not operate to prevent removal under CAFA because
none of CAFA’s exemptions applied.114 The district court agreed with the
plaintiff, however, “holding CAFA and [Section] 22(a) cannot mutually
coexist and that the specific bar against removal in the Securities Act of 1933
trumps CAFA’s general grant of diversity and removal jurisdiction.”115
Defendants sought permission to appeal the remand order, which the Ninth
Circuit granted.116
Applying a de novo review standard, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district
court’s order remanding the case.117 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning rested on

108 533

F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008).
at 1032.
110 Id. at 1032–33 (Plaintiffs alleged violations of sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l (a)(2) and 77o.).
111 See id. at 1033.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1033–34.
109 Id.
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two grounds. First, the court determined that the defendant did not meet its
burden to establish that removal was proper, given the traditional rule that
“removal statutes are strictly construed against removal,” with doubts
resolved against removability.118 Second, the court compared the two statutes
and determined that the 1933 Act’s prohibition against removal was more
specific than “CAFA’s general grant of the right of removal of high-dollar
class actions.”119 “It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute
dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a
later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.”120 The court
reasoned the 1933 Act was more specific because it applies only to a narrow
subject of securities cases and because the non-removal provision, Section
22, applies more precisely only to claims arising under that Act.121 In
contrast, CAFA “applies to ‘a generalized spectrum’ of class actions.”122
Thus, the court held the plaintiffs class action that alleged violations of only
the 1933 Act was not removable.123

B. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach
Fewer than six months after the Ninth Circuit decided the Luther case,
the Seventh Circuit decided Katz v. Gerardi, in which it reached the opposite
conclusion.124 According to the Seventh Circuit, CAFA should prevail over
the 1933 Act.125 Three primary reasons underlie the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Katz: (1) an apparent belief that the plaintiff plead nonviable
claims under the 1933 Act specifically to avoid removal to federal court; (2)
the maxim that older laws generally must yield to conflicting newer laws
when neither statute is more specific than the other; and (3) its conclusion

118 Id. at 1034 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941));
Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). This ground has been called into question
by the Supreme Court’s decision in 2014 in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S.
81, 89 (2014) (citing Standard Fire Ins. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 593–94 (2013) (quoting S. Rep.
109-14, at 43 (2005)), in which the Court declared that no anti-removal presumption accompanies
removal under CAFA.
119 Luther, 533 F.3d at 1034.
120 Id. (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 552 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2008).
125 Id. at 561.
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that to hold Section 22(a) prevailed would render most of CAFA’s removal
provisions “pointless.”126 Each of these reasons is discussed in turn.
Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit in Katz expressed
significant skepticism regarding whether the plaintiff’s claims arose under
the 1933 Act at all.127 The plaintiff’s proposed class included persons who
contributed to a real estate investment trust in exchange for interests, called
A-1 units, in the trust.128 When the owners of the trust merged with another
company, the owners offered those with original A-1 units money or new
units in the merger’s newly formed entity.129 The plaintiff accepted cash for
the units but then filed a putative class action in state court claiming the
merger violated the terms of the original A-1 units.130 The defendant removed
the action pursuant to CAFA.131
Plaintiff’s class-complaint alleged claims under the 1933 Act, but the
defendants argued that plaintiff cast the complaint under the 1933 Act
specifically to avoid removal to federal court.132 There was, after all, a
duplicative class action pending in the District Court for the District of
Colorado with the same putative class of plaintiffs against the same
defendants arising from the same transaction.133 The difference, however,
was that in the Colorado case, the plaintiff had asserted state law claims,
rather than 1933 Act claims, taking that case out of Section 22(a)’s
prohibition and rendering it removable to the Colorado federal district
court.134 The defendants thus urged the court to deny remand because if the
court were to look beyond the allegations of the complaint, it would find that
the plaintiff’s alleged claims under the 1933 Act were not viable.135
Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit expressed skepticism
concerning the doctrine through which the plaintiff argued its 1933 Act

126 Id.

at 560–63.
at 560.
128 Id. at 559.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08 cv 04035, 2008 WL 4376815, at *1, *3 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23,
2008), rev’d by 552 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2008).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See id.
127 Id.
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claims in Seventh Circuit case were viable.136 The Seventh Circuit even
characterized the plaintiff’s actions as “word play designed to overcome the
actual text of the securities laws.”137
Nevertheless, and unlike the Seventh Circuit, the district court concluded
the state court was the proper forum for the propriety of the alleged claims to
be determined due to Section 22(a)’s prohibition on removal.138 Because
plaintiff alleged solely claims arising under the 1933 Act, the district court
reasoned that Section 22(a) evidenced “Congress’s intent to have such
actions heard in state court if they were initially filed there.”139 Further,
recognizing “a plaintiff is the master of his complaint,” the court determined
that “even if the Court agreed with Defendants that Katz’s claims under the
[1933] Act lacked merit and that Katz alleged them to avoid removal,” such
claims could still not be removed under Section 22(a).140 Regarding
defendants’ arguments that removal was proper under CAFA, the district
court disagreed, instead finding the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Luther
persuasive.141 Like the Ninth Circuit before it, the district court concluded
that Section 22 of the 1933 Act was more specific than CAFA, because
section “22(a) deals only with securities litigation,” while CAFA “covers
class actions in many substantive fields.”142 Thus, the district court granted
the plaintiff’s motion to remand.143
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit’s discussion began by pointing out, as the
defendants had argued below, that only purchasers of securities may pursue
actions under the 1933 Act.144 But the Seventh Circuit pointed out that the
plaintiff “sold his units for cash; he did not buy any new security.”145 Then,
characterizing the “new A-1 Units” as “figments of a lawyer’s imagination,”

136 Katz, 552 F.3d at 560; Katz, 2008 WL 4376815, at *4 (“The Court does not necessarily
find Katz’s argument factually persuasive that he is a purchaser or acquirer of securities under the
fundamental change doctrine.”)
137 Katz, 552 F.3d at 560.
138 Katz, 2008 WL 4376815, at *4.
139 Id. (citing Luther v. Countrywide Home Loan Servicing, L.P., 533 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.
2008); and Nauheim v. Interpublic Group of Cos., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 WL 1888843 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 16, 2003)).
140 Id. at *4.
141 Id.
142 Katz, 552 F.3d at 560.
143 Katz, 2008 WL 4376815, at *5.
144 Katz, 552 F.3d at 560.
145 Id.
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the Seventh Circuit warned that using “legally fictious (and factually
nonexistent) ‘new A-1 Units’ to nullify a legislative decision that only buyers
have rights under the 1933 Act would be wholly unjustified,” and “this circuit
follows the statutes rather than trying to evade them with legal fictions.”146
According to the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff’s claims arose under state
law rather than under federal securities law.147 It stated, “[i]t is hard to
distinguish between a claim artfully designed to defeat federal jurisdiction
and one that is properly pleaded but unsuccessful on the merits, but it cannot
be right to say that a pleader’s choice of language always defeats removal.”148
Instead, the court declared:
A complaint pleads grievances rather than law; a federal
court must decide for itself the claim’s legal classification.
This is true whether the pleader tries to get into federal court
by insisting that a state-law claim “really” arises under
federal law, or to stay out by declaring that a claim arising
under federal law “really” depends on state law alone.149
The Seventh Circuit warned that parties cannot block removal or,
conversely, try to attain federal court jurisdiction by asserting that a claim
“really” arises under the law that results in the desired forum that would
otherwise be unavailable.150
After expressing this significant doubt that the plaintiff’s claims arose
under the 1933 Act, the court acknowledged federal securities law had “some
role to play” such that the court thought “it best to assume that Katz’s
complaint is not just artful pleading, and to ask whether § 22(a) insulates all
claims under the 1933 Act from removal under the 2005 Act.”151 Moving to
the interplay between Section 22(a) and CAFA, like the Ninth Circuit, the
Seventh Circuit found the provisions incompatible and declared “one or the
other must yield.”152 “Usually the older law yields to the newer.”153 Without
citation then, the Seventh Circuit stated that the canon relied on by the Ninth
146 Id. (citing SEC v. Jakubowski, 150 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1998); Isquith v. Caremark
Int’l, Inc., 136 F.3d 531, 535–37 (7th Cir. 1998)).
147 Katz, 552 F.3d at 560 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 561.
150 See id.
151 Id. (emphasis in original).
152 Id.
153 Id.
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Circuit—preserving older, more specific statutes over newer, more general
statutes—”works when one statute is a subset of the other,” and it questioned
the premise that the 1933 Act is more specific than CAFA. 154
The Seventh Circuit pointed out that while Section 22(a) covers only
securities actions, its coverage is not limited to securities actions of a certain
size.155 Rather, Section 22(a) covers single-investor suits and class actions—
both large and small.156 By contrast, it observed CAFA applies only to large,
multi-state class actions.157 And it posed the following question: “Is the 1933
Act more specific because it deals only with securities law, or is [CAFA]
more specific because it deals only with nationwide class actions?”158 Finding
no answer to its own question, the court declared the canon relied on by the
Ninth Circuit did not provide the answer to the question of which statute
should prevail.159 Since Katz was decided, courts in the Second Circuit have
agreed with its analysis.160
The court in Katz also stated its conclusion was necessary because to hold
Section 22(a) prevailed would render most of CAFA’s removal provisions
“pointless.”161 It stated CAFA’s three exemptions listed in Section 1453(d),
which mirror the exemptions in Section 1332(d)(9), “tell[] us how the new
removal rule applies to corporate and securities actions.”162 Unremarkably, it
stated that claims listed in those sections are not removable, but other
securities actions that meet CAFA’s requirements are removable.163 It then
declared that to read Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act as preventing the
plaintiff’s case from being removed “would be to make most of [CAFA’s
removal provisions] pointless.”164
Remarkably, given the Ninth Circuit’s opposite decision just months
earlier, the Seventh Circuit concluded, “Section 1453(d) leaves no doubt
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.

at 561–62.
e.g., Owen v. Elastos Found., 438 F. Supp. 3d 187, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing
Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom., Inc., 368 F. 86, 102 (2d Cir. 2004), which held a nonremoval provision in the Bankruptcy Act did not prevent removal under CAFA).
161 Katz, 552 F.3d at 562.
162 Id. at 562.
163 Id.
164 Id.
160 See,
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about how the 1933 Act . . . and [CAFA] fit together.”165 It stated the Ninth
Circuit in Luther “failed to recognize that § 22(a) of the 1933 Act is not a
subset” of CAFA and did not “appear to understand that § 1453(d) [in which
CAFA’s removal provisions appear] tells us how [CAFA] affects securities
cases.”166
Turning to CAFA’s security exemptions—subsections 1453(d)(1)
through (3),—the Seventh Circuit stated that the first removal exemption did
not apply as the class plaintiffs’ claims did not concern a “covered security,”
meaning one traded on a national exchange.167 The court concluded the
second exemption did not apply because that subsection dealt with corporate
internal affairs, and the plaintiffs’ claims were not characterized as such.168
As to the third exemption, however, the named plaintiff, like the plaintiffs in
the Cardarelli case discussed below, argued that CAFA’s removal provisions
exempted plaintiff’s 1933 Act claim because the claim “‘relates to the rights,
duties, (including fiduciary duties), and obligations relating to or created by
or pursuant to any security.”169 The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument,
however, that subsection 1453(d)(3) exempted securities-related lawsuits
only if the plaintiff’s claims arose out of the terms of securities themselves
and not if the claims arose under the 1933 Act due to alleged misconduct in
the initial offerings of securities.170
As to the removability of plaintiff’s claims, the court remanded the case
to the district court for a hearing on whether the plaintiff’s claims arose from
the terms of the securities at issue such that subsection 1453(d)(3) would
exempt them from CAFA’s reach.171 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that to be
exempted from CAFA’s reach under this removal provision, the claims
would have to have arisen from the securities themselves.172 And, if the
claims arose from the securities themselves such that the provision exempted
the claims from CAFA’s reach, then it would be impossible for the claims to
have arisen solely under the 1933 Act, so Section 22(a) still would not apply
to prevent the removal of the plaintiff’s claims to federal court. The court
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.

at 562–63.
at 563.

169 Id.
170 Id. (citing Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d 25, 31–33 (2d Cir. 2008)); see also
Owen v. Elastos Found., 438 F. Supp. 3d 187, 193–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
171 Katz, 552 F.3d at 563.
172 Id.
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explained that if plaintiff’s claims were exempted from CAFA, they would
likely be removable under “some other statute, for a suit to enforce a
security’s terms does not arise under the 1933 Act.”173

C. Analysis of the Approaches
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided the Dart Cherokee Basin Operating
Co. v. Owens case,174 which some have argued undermines the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning and strengthens the Seventh Circuit’s.175 The Court in
Dart Cherokee, while analyzing whether parties had to submit proof to
support allegations concerning the amount-in-controversy requirement in
CAFA, announced that “no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking
CAFA.”176 Instead, according to the Supreme Court, “CAFA’s ‘provisions
should be read broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions
should be heard in federal court if properly removed by any defendant.’” 177
After Dart Cherokee, a district court in California decided the Coffey case
in which the court opined that “part of Luther’s reasoning has been
undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in Dart Cherokee.”178 The court
in Coffey pointed out that the Ninth Circuit in Luther followed the traditional
rule strictly construing removal statutes against removal.179 But the court in
Coffey pointed out that the Supreme Court in Dart Cherokee rejected that
traditional rule in CAFA cases.180 The court in Coffey further pointed out that
“one authority has suggested that Dart Cherokee’s ‘assertion that no
antiremoval presumption applies to cases removed under CAFA,’ calls into

173 Id.
174 135

S. Ct. 547 (2014).
e.g., Coffey v. Ripple Labs Inc., 333 F. Supp. 3d 952 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2018); 2
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12:6 (14th ed. 2017).
176 Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 558.
177 Id. (citing Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (2013) (quoting S.
Rep. 109-14, at 43 (2005)).
178 Coffey, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 958 (citing Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. L.L.C., 781 F.3d
1178, 1183 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting it was not bound by Luther because Dart Cherokee
undermined the reasoning on which the Ninth Circuit based its holding in Luther)).
179 Id. (citing Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Serv., 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir.
2008)).
180 Id. at 958 (citing Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 554; and Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg.
L.L.C., 781 F.3d 1178, 1183 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015)).
175 See,
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question Luther’s holding” regarding Section 22(a) and CAFA’s removal
provision.181 The Ninth Circuit’s approach may, therefore, be on the decline.
The Seventh Circuit’s approach, however, is also not without flaws.
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit’s suggestion that no answer exists to the question
of which statute is more specific is logically flawed. To start, the Seventh
Circuit asked the wrong question. The appropriate question was not, as the
Seventh Circuit put it, “whether § 22(a) insulates all claims under the 1933
Act from removal under the 2005 Act.”182 The question it should have asked
was whether Section 22(a) was more specific than the removal provisions in
CAFA found in Section 1453. This question would more logically compare
each statute’s removal provisions to determine which is more specific.
Had the question been properly focused, the court would likely have
concluded that Section 22(a) is more specific. Section 22(a) prohibits
removal only if claims are brought solely pursuant to the 1933 Act. That
means the claims can involve only allegations of defendant’s failure to
disclose information required by the 1933 Act in conjunction with the
defendant’s original offering of the securities at issue. Applying Section
22(a) further requires that those securities cannot be ones that are traded on
a national market. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Cyan makes clear
that Section 22(a)—as amended by SLUSA—covers only a small subsection
of securities-related claims. It does not apply to an alleged claim arising under
state law or arising under the 1934 Act. It does not apply to claims arising
solely under the 1933 Act if the claims involve a covered security, meaning
any security traded on a national market. Even if the claim meets all of
Section 22(a)’s other requirements, the removal bar does not apply if
plaintiffs combine their 1933 Act claims with any other claims. In each of
these situations, Section 22(a) would not apply to the alleged securities class
action. In other words, all of these claims would be beyond Section 22(a)’s
reach.
In contrast, CAFA’s removal provisions are broad, as they mirror
CAFA’s jurisdictional grants. Thus, CAFA removal applies to most large
class actions covering many different subjects. As long as plaintiffs allege a
sufficiently large class—meaning the class includes at least 100 members and
involve aggregate damages that exceed $5 million—and sues a defendant
who is minimally diverse, CAFA applies, unless one of CAFA’s exemptions

181 Id.

(citing 16 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—SCOPE OF REMOVAL, § 107.91[1][b]

(2018)).
182 Katz

v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 2009).
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also applies, and keeping in mind the Supreme Court’s instruction to interpret
removal under CAFA broadly.
Thus, the suggestion that one cannot discern which statute is more general
and which is more specific is based on the failure to focus on the relevant
removal provisions—the narrowly applicable Section 22(a) and the broadly
applicable removal provisions in CAFA that even the Supreme Court has
declared must be interpreted broadly. The idea that one can make a plausible
argument that one cannot determine when comparing the two statutes’
removal provisions which is more specific and which is more general strains
credibility.
In addition, the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in the Cyan Inc. v. Beaver
County Employees183 case also suggests CAFA should not be read to trump
the 1933 Act. Although the case did not involve the conflict between CAFA
and the 1933 Act, the Court analyzed a similar issue—the relationship
between Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act and the removal provisions in
SLUSA.184 Recall that Congress passed SLUSA in part to address plaintiffs’
use of the class action device to pursue claims that defendants and other
critics argued lacked merit. SLUSA, like the Reform Act that Congress
passed earlier, was targeted specifically to address perceived abusive use of
the class action device in the context of securities litigation. To prevent these
perceived abusive class actions involving securities, SLUSA provides for,
among other things, exclusive federal court jurisdiction and removal of
“covered” class actions—those involving securities traded on a national
exchange and for which allegations were “based upon the statutory or
common law of any State or subdivision thereof.”185
Like the conflict that is the subject of this paper, over time, a similar
conflict developed in the circuit courts over whether SLUSA divested state
courts of concurrent jurisdiction over alleged 1933 Act violations filed in
state courts and whether its removal provisions superseded the 1933 Act’s
prohibition against removal.186 Thus, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
183 138

S. Ct. 1061 (2018).
138 S. Ct. at 1068 (emphasis in original); 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
185 15 U.S.C. § 78bb. But unlike CAFA’s aim to have large class actions litigated in federal
courts, SLUSA’s purpose was to foreclose covered class actions based on state law from being
litigated altogether. Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1067. Thus, cases removed under SLUSA are not to be
litigated in federal court but rather to be dismissed to give effect to SLUSA’s prohibition against
pursuing large class actions founded on state law alleging dishonest practices related to a nationally
traded security’s sale. Id.
186 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1069.
184 Cyan,
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decide those issues.187 The plaintiffs in Cyan were three pension funds and
an investor.188 The defendants were a telecommunications company—
Cyan—and its officers and directors.189 In an initial public offering, the
plaintiffs bought shares of Cyan stock.190 When the stock value declined, the
plaintiffs filed a class action in California state court, alleging that the
defendants’ original offering documents included material misstatements that
violated the 1933 Act.191
Importantly, the plaintiffs did not assert any state-law-based claims and
did not involve securities that were traded on a national stock exchange.
Nevertheless, the defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.192 Their argument was that SLUSA’s amendment to the
1933 Act’s concurrent jurisdiction clause “stripped state courts of power to
adjudicate 1933 Act claims in ‘covered class actions.’”193 Certain amici also
argued the related point that SLUSA’s removal provisions superseded
Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act.194 The Supreme Court rejected both
arguments.195 Instead, the Court declared in cases involving securities not
traded on a national exchange, SLUSA “does nothing to deprive state courts
of their jurisdiction to decide class actions brought under the 1933 Act,” and
SLUSA’s removal authorization does not apply either.196
In its analysis, among other things, the Court rejected the defendants’
arguments that to interpret the statute differently than the defendants
proposed would render parts of SLUSA meaningless.197 The Supreme Court
instead pointed out that it had “encountered many examples of Congress
legislating in that hyper-vigilant way, to ‘remov[e] any doubt’ as to things
not particularly doubtful in the first instance.”198 As discussed below, similar

187 Id.
188 Id.

at 1068.

189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.

at 1068–69.
at 1078.
196 Id. at 1069, 1075.
197 Id. at 1073 (“Cyan contends, unless we take up its invitation to look to § 77p(f)(2)’s
definition of ‘covered class action,’ the except clause excepts ‘exactly nothing.’”)
198 Id. at 1074 (citing Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 383–84 (2013); Fort
Stewart Schs. v. FLRA, 495 U.S. 641, 646 (1990)).
195 Id.
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arguments regarding CAFA’s exemptions related to securities class actions
should also fail.
When courts find that both the 1933 Act and CAFA apply in a way that
creates the conflict, courts must choose between these different approaches,
each flawed in its own ways, to decide whether a case can be removed and
heard in federal court or not. As illustrated below, however, the statutes do
not have to be read as inevitably raising the conflict. Rather, the two statutes
can be harmonized by reading CAFA’s relevant exemption in a way that
avoids the conflict altogether.

III. HARMONIZING THE STATUTES
Both statutes have been disparaged for how confusing they are to
understand. Perhaps, therefore, no one should find it surprising that courts
have struggled and reached opposite conclusions regarding the interplay
between Section 22(a)’s non-removal provision and CAFA’s generous
removal provisions. Section 22(a), especially as it relates to SLUSA, has been
harshly criticized for its perplexing wording and convoluted application. For
example, after listening to the Supreme Court oral argument in the Cyan Inc.
v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund case,199 one scholar
highlighted the justices’ use of the word “gibberish” to describe Section 22(a)
and observed that Section 22(a)’s effect on SLUSA was “so complicated that
neither the [Supreme Court] justices nor the lawyers arguing the case could
really understand it.”200
Similarly CAFA’s language is just as puzzling as evidenced by the
significant litigation CAFA has spawned in the sixteen years since its initial
enactment.201 CAFA’s provisions have been described as “detailed,
complicated, and replete with both undefined terms and ambiguous phrases,”
leaving “questions implicating forum allocation unanswered,” and
“guarantee[ing] years of work for lawyers and courts that is unrelated to the

199 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018) (settling conflicts surrounding jurisdiction and removal in cases
in which both the 1933 Act and in the 1998 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act applied);
Johnson, supra note 47, at 349–351 (discussing same).
200 Richard K. Neumann Jr., Why Congress Drafts Gibberish, 16 LEGAL COMM. &
RHETORIC: JALWD 111, 111 (2019).
201 For treatment of the broad variety of CAFA-related issues that have been litigated over
the past sixteen years, see Marcy Hogan Greer (ed.), A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS,
The Class Action Fairness Act, Chapter 11 (3d ed. 2021).

9 PIERCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

TO REMOVE OR NOT TO REMOVE

1/18/22 10:49 PM

627

merits of the underlying dispute.”202 It has likewise been described as “poorly
drafted” and its wording characterized as both “clumsy” and
“bewildering.”203 CAFA has been derided as “the product of poor
draftsmanship.”204 Recently, a court went so far as to describe opinions
interpreting CAFA as “supply[ing] even more confusion with their nuanced
and potentially conflicting holdings, or [as] suffer[ing] from the lack of any
meaningful analysis at all.”205
Against this backdrop, the confusion surrounding the two statutes’
removal provisions’ applicability and operation is unremarkable, but that fact
does not lessen the need for clarification. One of the securities-related
exemptions in CAFA, subsection 1453(d)(3), provides an avenue to avoid the
conflict between CAFA and the 1933 Act. The stated purpose behind the
securities-related exemptions in CAFA, after all, was to “avoid disturbing in
any way the federal vs. state court jurisdictional lines already drawn in the
securities litigation class action context by the enactment of the [SLUSA].”206
Unfortunately, while some courts have in fact interpreted CAFA’s securities
provisions to avoid affecting jurisdictional lines in securities class actions,207
others have interpreted the exemptions overly narrowly.
As illustrated below, where a class action alleges only 1933 Act claims,
a logical argument can be made that such claims “solely” relate to the “rights,
202 Burbank, supra note 68, at 1444; see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1857 (2008) (similar
criticisms).
203 In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013).
204 Schumel v. Bank Mut. Corp., No. 17-CV-1240-JPS, 2017 WL 4564908, at *5 (E.D.
Wis. Oct. 11, 2017).
205 Id. Another potential area for confusion is the use of the term “removal jurisdiction.”
See, e.g., Vanbecelaere v. YayYo, Inc., No. CV 20-7997-PA (AGRx), 2020 WL 5362696, at *3
(C.D. Ca. Sept. 8, 2020) (concluding that because actions were not removable under CAFA and
because Section 22(a) bars removal, the court “lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction” over the actions
when in fact, SLUSA provided subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts for the purpose of
dismissal). Removal, however, is a purely statutory construct that is distinct from the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction. In the context of Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act, for example, a federal
court can have jurisdiction over an action (concurrent with state courts) under the 1933 Act, at the
same time that the action is not removable to court based on Section 22(a). This distinction matters
because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, while failure to follow rules for removal can
be waived. See Cyan v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (2018).
206 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1454 (citing S. REP. 109-14, at 45 and Cook, supra note
41, at 646–47)).
207 See, e.g., Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2012)
(concluding CAFA did not apply because federal jurisdiction existed under SLUSA).

9 PIERCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

628

1/18/22 10:49 PM

BAYLOR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3

duties, and obligations” “related to” any “security,” and thus such claims fall
within 1332(d)(9)(C)’s exemption to CAFA jurisdiction and 1453(d)(3)’s
exemption to removal authority.208 Some courts read the exemptions in this
way. In addition to being consistent with the exemptions’ plain language, the
result is preferable as it would exempt from CAFA’s reach the kind of cases
in which the two removal provisions would inevitably collide because 1933
Act claims would not be subject to CAFA at all. Some courts, however,
interpret this CAFA exemption to not apply to cases that allege violations of
the 1933 Act, as opposed to alleging claims that arise out of the security
instruments themselves.209
Subsection 1332(d)(9)(c) states the following:
(9) Paragraph (2)210 shall not apply to any class action
that solely involves a claim—
(C) that relates to the rights, duties (including fiduciary
duties), and obligations relating to or created by or pursuant
to any security (as defined under section 2(a)(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1)) and the
regulations issued thereunder).211
The Second Circuit was the circuit court to interpret subsections
1332(d)(9)(3) and 1453(d)(9)(C)’s exemptions.212 The case, Estate of Pew v.
Caradelli, involved alleged violations of New York state law, rather than
violations of the 1933 Act, but the analysis applies equally to both kinds of
claims.213 The majority in Pew construed the exemption in the narrow way
described above.214 The plaintiffs had sought relief under New York’s
consumer fraud statute, alleging that officers of the issuer of the securities,
along with the issuer’s auditor, violated the law when they marketed the

208 28

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(c).
e.g., Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Marina G.
Aronchik, A Fair Share (of Removal): Resolving a Conflict Between the Class Action Fairness Act
and the Securities Act, 4 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 456, 466 (2009).
210 Paragraph 2, in relevant part, states, “(2) The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
211 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(c).
212 Estate of Pew v. Caradelli, 527 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2008).
213 Id. at 27.
214 Id.
209 See,
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securities and failed to disclose the issuer’s insolvency.215 The plaintiffs sued
in state court, and the defendants removed the case to federal court, relying
on CAFA for jurisdiction and removal authority.216 Relying on the exemption
to jurisdiction in subsection 1332(d)(9)(C) along with the exemption to
removal in 1453(d)(3), the plaintiffs moved to remand.217 Agreeing with the
plaintiffs, the district court remanded the action.218 The question on appeal
was whether the plaintiffs’ claims fell within the CAFA exemptions.219
The majority rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, with which the dissent and
some lower courts agree,220 that the terms “‘rights . . . relating to . . . any
security” in 1332(d)(9)(C) should include the right to bring any cause of
action that relates to a security.221 Thus, the argument would be that plaintiffs’
claims related to the security because the plaintiffs’ claims arose from the
marketing of those securities and the failure to disclose relevant information
about the financial situation of the issuers of the securities. Without the
securities, therefore, plaintiffs would have no claims. Thus, their claims
related to the securities.
The majority, however, took a much narrower view of subsection
1332(d)(9)(C)’s exemption from CAFA jurisdiction and 1453(d)(3)’s
corresponding exemption from CAFA removal and held plaintiffs’ case was
not exempted from CAFA’s reach.222 In doing so, the majority identified
three reasons to support its conclusion: plain language, the exemptions’
relationship to other statutory provisions, and legislative history.223 The
majority first stated that an analysis of the statute’s language, although
imperfect, supported its conclusion.224 After explaining its reading of the
relevant provisions, however, the majority in Cardarelli concluded the

215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.

at 28.

218 Id.
219 Id.
220 See, e.g., Firemen’s Ret. Sys. of St. Louis on Behalf of SCANA Corp. v. Addison, No.
CV 3:18-501-MBS, 2018 WL 11312486, at *7 (D.S.C. June 27, 2018); Schumel v. Bank Mut.
Corp., Nos. 17-CV-1240-JPS, 17-CV-1241-JPS, 17-CV-1242-JPS, 2017 WL 4564908, at *3 (E.D.
Wis. Oct. 11, 2017).
221 E.g., Firemen’s Ret. Sys. of St. Louis, 2018 WL 11312486, at *7; Schumel, 2017 WL
4564908, at *3.
222 Estate of Pew v. Caradelli, 527 F.3d 25, 33 (2d Cir. 2008).
223 Id. at 30.
224 Id.
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language of the exemptions was ambiguous and the answer not “entirely clear
given the imperfect wording of the statute.”225 Thus, it explained that one
must look beyond the statute’s plain meaning.226 Thus, the majority
considered the statutory context and legislative history. It declared that the
statutory framework required a narrow reading of subsections 1332(d)(9)(C)
and 1453(d)(3).227 It concluded its narrow reading is most consistent with
CAFA’s purpose; thus, it held the case did not fall within the exemptions.228
The following discussion explains each of the arguments and illustrates the
ways in which each is flawed, rendering the narrow reading of 1332(d)(9)(C)
and 1453(d)(3) equally flawed.

A. Statutory Language
As part of the statutory language analysis, the majority stated the statute
itself provides “clues” about what each of the terms, “rights,” “duties,” and
“obligations” in the exemptions means.229 The fact that the statute includes
“fiduciary duties” as an example of the “duties,” in the court’s view,
reinforced the “common understanding” that duties are owed by persons or
companies. And it stated that while “obligations” can be owed by persons or
instruments, the natural reading of the exemption’s language is to
“differentiate obligations from duties by reading obligations to be those
created in instruments, such as a certificate of incorporation, an indenture, a
note, or some other corporate document.”230 The court recognized, however,
that certain duties and obligations “of course, ‘relate to’ securities even
though they are not rooted in a corporate document but are instead
superimposed by a state’s corporation law or common law on the
relationships underlying that document.”231
Nevertheless, the majority determined that duties and obligations that
relate to securities but that arise from law—as opposed to those that arise
from a security or its instruments—are not exempted by subsection
1332(d)(9)(C) and are thus not exempted by 1453(d)(3).232 Under this

225 Id.

at 26, 30 (citing Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)).

226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.

at 26
at 31.
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reading, the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the fraudulent marketing of a debt
security were not exempted because the fraudulent marketing claims did not
arise from a breach of a duty created by the instruments themselves, but rather
arose from a breach of a duty that arose from a source of law. 233
It further reasoned the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the exemptions would
defeat any limitation meant by the use of the term “rights” in the phrase,
“rights, duties . . ., and obligations,” and the exemptions’ later inclusion of
the terms “related to or created by or pursuant to.”234 To illustrate, the
majority separated the parts of the exemptions as follows:
[i] [Section 1332(d)(2) and section 1453(b)] shall not apply
to any class action that solely involves a claim that relates to
[ii] the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and
obligations
[iii] relating to or created by or pursuant to
[iv] any security . . . .235
The majority explained the exemption, being made up of these four parts,
could “not be read to cover any and all claims that relate to any security,”
because reading it that way “would afford no meaning to [ii] and [iii], which
are evidently terms of limitation.”236
The way in which the majority broke up the exemptions, however, and its
conclusion that they apply only to claims that arise from securities
instruments themselves, is logically flawed. It treats all three options in part
[iii] as meaning only “created by,” which ignores the options of “relating to”
or “pursuant to” that also appear in the language of part [iii]. Just as the
majority complains that the plaintiffs’ reading would ignore a part of the
statute, the majority’s reading ignores a part of the statute. The majority
ignores that part [iii] has three options, any of which alone is sufficient, as
evidenced by the inclusion of the word “or” in between each of the options.
233 Id. at 26; see also Greenwich Fin. Servs. Distressed Mortg. Fund 3 L.L.C. v.
Countrywide Fin. Corp., 603 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 2010) (clarifying that in the Second Circuit, to
determine whether 1332(d)(9)(c) exempts an action from CAFA’s jurisdiction and removal
provisions, the inquiry should focus on determining whether the source of the right the plaintiff
seeks to enforce arises from a security or security-related instrument, rather than from a source of
law).
234 Id.
235 Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 2008).
236 Id.
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Thus, building on the majority’s own analysis, one could argue that
subsection should be broken up as follows:
[i] [Section 1332(d)(2) and section 1453(b)] shall not apply
to any class action that solely involves a claim that relates to
[ii] the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and
obligations
[iii.a.] relating to or
[iii.b.] created by or
[iii.c.] pursuant to
[iv] any security . . . .
Allowing part [iii]’s “relating to” to be treated as an option separate from
the “created by or pursuant to” language in part [iii] would give meaning to
each of the items listed and to Congress’s decision to separate those items
with the disjunctive word “or.” This reading would support the broader view
that the plaintiffs’ claims that the defendants violated New York law when
they failed to make relevant disclosures when they sold the securities to
plaintiffs are indeed claims that are related to the securities. Without the
securities, no such claims would exist. Thus, subsection 1332(d)(9)(C)
should be read to exempt plaintiffs’ claims from CAFA’s jurisdictional reach,
and 1453(d)(3) should be read to exempt them from CAFA’s removal
authority.
Indeed, some courts have read the exemption to do just that. These courts
disagree with the Second Circuit’s narrow interpretation. For example, the
court in Schumel v. Bank Mutual Corporation did not find the plain language
of subsection 1332(d)(9)(C) sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the kind of
“nuanced scrutiny” applied by the Second Circuit in the Cardarelli case.237
Finding no controlling authority in its circuit, the court in Schumel stated it
was “constrained to rely on the plain text of the statute.”238 The court then
characterized the language in subsection 1332(d)(9)(C) as having “incredibly

237 Schumel v. Bank Mut. Corp., Nos. 17-CV-1240-JPS, 17-CV-1241-JPS, 17-CV-1242JPS, 2017 WL 4564908, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 11, 2017).
238 Id. at *5 (pointing out that both parties relied on opinions from other circuits and finding
it “most prudent to avoid reliance” on them) (citing Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1187
(11th Cir. 2007); Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011)).
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broad reach.”239 Given the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the court in
Schumel held that doubts about federal subject matter jurisdiction should be
resolved in favor of rejecting jurisdiction.240 “If Congress had intended a
different result,” the court reasoned, Congress “could have carefully crafted
CAFA’s language more succinctly.”241
Even the majority in Cardarelli conceded that certain duties and
obligations “of course, ‘relate to’ securities even though they are not rooted
in a corporate document but are instead superimposed by a state’s corporation
law or common law on the relationships underlying that document.”242
Indeed, the Supreme Court has described the word “relates” as “highly
general,” and the Court interprets the word “relates” broadly.243 In
interpreting “relates” in provisions in other statutes, for example, the Court
has stated that the words “relate to” have a “broad-common-sense meaning,”
such that one thing relates to another “if it has a connection with or reference
to” the other.244 Certainly, one can reasonably conclude that if a plaintiff
alleges a claim under the 1933 Act based on the assertion that a seller violated
the 1933 Act, that claim, although not arising from the security, should
nevertheless relate to the security.
Indeed, as described above, the language of this exemption does not
require plaintiffs to be holders of securities nor does it require that plaintiffs’
claims arise out of the securities themselves. Instead, the wording states the
exemption covers a class action that solely involves a claim related to the
rights, duties, and obligations related to or created by or pursuant to any
security.

B. Statutory Framework
The majority in Cardarelli further supported its holding by reasoning that
the plaintiff’s reading of subsection 1332(d)(9)(C) and 1453(d)(3) would
render other provisions, namely 1332(d)(9)(A) and 1453(d)(1),

239 Id.

at *3, *5 (interpreting exemption to cover claims relating to breach of fiduciary

240 Id.

(citing Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 457 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2006)).

duties).
241 Id.
242 Estate

of Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 2008).
e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 38 (1996) (interpreting
the words “relate to” as they appear in the McCarran Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)).
244 Id. (quoting Met. Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
243 See,
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superfluous.245 Subsection 1332(d)(9)(A) exempts from CAFA’s jurisdiction
and 1453(d)(1) exempts from CAFA’s removal authority class actions
“concerning a covered security.”246 According to this view, if subsections
1332(d)(9)(C) and 1453(d)(3) were read to exempt all claims that relate to
securities, there would be no need to also separately exempt claims that
concern a covered security.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Cyan v. Beaver County, however,
suggests this argument regarding rendering parts of the statute superfluous
should not be given much weight.247 There, the Supreme Court was analyzing
SLUSA’s removal provision’s interaction with the 1933 Act’s non-removal
provision.248 One of the primary arguments the defendants raised in favor of
interpreting SLUSA to allow removal of all securities related to class actions
was that an interpretation of SLUSA that allowed Section 22(a) to continue
barring removal of some kinds of securities cases would render parts of
SLUSA meaningless.249 The Supreme Court rejected this argument. In doing
so, the Court conceded that it was not sure why Congress drafted SLUSA to
include arguably superfluous language, but the Court opined that Congress
could have added the supposedly extraneous clause “in a more general excess
of caution” and that it had observed other instances in which Congress
legislated in “hyper-vigilant” ways.250
The argument then that subsection 1332(d)(9)(C) must be broadly
interpreted to avoid rendering 1332(d)(9)(A) meaningless is unpersuasive in
light of the Court’s reasoning in Cyan. Instead, Congress’s decision to
include overlapping exemptions in CAFA subsections 1332(d)(9)(A) and
1332(d)(9)(C) could reflect, as the Court opined regarding overlapping
provisions in SLUSA, another example of Congress drafting hyper-vigilant
legislation to make clear that CAFA did not change the jurisdictional regime
as it stood under existing securities laws.
Had Congress intended CAFA to override Section 22(a), it could have
made that fact clear. When Congress passed SLUSA to allow for removal of
certain categories of securities class actions to federal courts, it passed a
conforming amendment to Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act to make clear that
245 Cardarelli,

527 F.3d at 31.

246 Id.
247 138

S. Ct. 1061 (2018).

248 Id.
249 Id. at 1073 (“Cyan contends, unless we take up its invitation to look to § 77p(f)(2)’s
definition of ‘covered class action,’ the except clause excepts ‘exactly nothing.’”).
250 Id. at 1074.
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Section 22(a) did not apply to class actions covered by SLUSA.251 When it
passed CAFA, Congress passed no conforming amendment or any other kind
of amendment to Section 22(a). This lack of action undermines the
conclusion that Congress intended to override Section 22(a)’s removal
prohibition in securities cases brought as large class actions. Regarding the
specific kind of cases in which Section 22(a) and CAFA collide, the Supreme
Court in Cyan declared SLUSA “‘expresses no concern’ with ‘transactions
in uncovered securities’—precisely because they are not traded on national
markets.”252 Such suits, therefore, are not “a matter of distinct federal
concern.”253
With this context, one could reasonably conclude that the securities and
business governance exemptions codified in CAFA subsections 1332(d)(9)
and 1435(d) reflect the contemporaneous intent to carve out all securitiesrelated claims for which jurisdiction already existed under the securities
statutes, those arising under the 1933 and 1934 Acts and affected by the
passage of the Reform Act and SLUSA. After all, the Supreme Court
presumes that “Congress is aware of existing law when it passes
legislation,”254 even when the consideration of different pieces of litigation
do not overlap, and here, they did overlap.

C. Legislative Intent
The majority in Cardarelli also suggested the language in subsections
1332(d)(9)(C) and 1453(d)(3) reflected Congress’s intent not to disturb the
balance of federal and state court jurisdiction over securities litigation as that
jurisdiction had been set forth in the 1933 and 1934 Act, the Reform Act, and
finally in SLUSA.255 But narrowly interpreting these provisions, especially
in cases in which Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act conflicts with CAFA’s
removal exemption in 1453(d)(3), does disturb the balance of federal and
state court jurisdiction as that jurisdiction had been set forth in the securitiesspecific statutes prior to CAFA’s passage.

251 See
252 Id.

id. at 1068 (describing SLUSA’s amendments to Section 22(a)).
at 1071 (citing Chadbourne & Parke L.L.P. v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377 (2014)).

253 Id.
254 Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 516 (2012) (citing Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
489 U.S. 19, 32 (1990). Unrelated to this presumption, Hall’s interpretation of the law regarding
the sale of farm assets in Chapter 12 bankruptcy cases was superseded by statute, as stated in In re
Richards, 616 B.R. 879, 880–81 (S.D. Ind. 2020).
255 Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d 25, 32 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Here, again, the Supreme Court’s decision in Cyan undermines the
reasoning of the majority in Cardarelli. The defendants in Cyan argued that
SLUSA operated to deprive state courts of all large securities classes.256 But
the Supreme Court in Cyan illustrated the significance of the suggested
changes and the unlikelihood that Congress would have made this change
lightly.257 Historically, the Court declared, state courts “had as much or more
power over the 1933 Act’s enforcement as over any federal statutes.”258
Section 22(a)’s prohibition against removal codified that state court power
over 1933 Act cases. In light of that history, the Supreme Court declared
Congress was unlikely to make “radical—but entirely implicit” changes to
the way in which the 1933 Act is enforced.259 Defendant’s argument that
SLUSA stripped state courts of concurrent jurisdiction over all large class
actions involving the offering of any kind of security would be a significant
change to the operation of Section 22(a)’s prohibition against removal. The
Court declared, “Congress does not ‘hide elephants in mouseholes.’”260
The majority in Cardarelli and courts that follow its lead, however,
suggest that in passing CAFA, Congress radically changed the way that the
1933 Act is enforced and did so implicitly and without amending or even
referring to the 1933 Act. SLUSA, at least, amended Section 22(a) and added
language to it to explicitly carve out from the 1933 Act’s prohibition against
removal the kinds of cases covered by SLUSA. To suggest that Congress,
through the passage of CAFA, intended to make the kind of radical change
about which the Supreme Court expressed significant skepticism in Cyan,
without referring to Section 22(a) at all, is simply untenable. Just as the
unanimous Court in Cyan rejected distortions of SLUSA’s text based on the
likelihood that “Congress must have wanted 1933 Act cases to be litigated in
federal court,” courts interpreting the conflict between CAFA removal and
Section 22(a) non-removal should reject distortions of subsection
1332(d)(9)(C), which would only cover claims arising from securities but not
those related to securities and brought under the 1933 Act or other securitiesspecific laws.
The majority in Cardarelli also attempted to bolster its narrow
interpretation of subsection 1332(d)(9)(C) by declaring that interpretation

256 See

Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1068.
at 1070–73.
258 Id. at 1071.
259 Id. (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
260 Id. (citing Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468).
257 Id.
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consistent with CAFA’s purpose and position within the statutory framework
of statutes concerning class actions and securities litigation.261 It reasoned
that the SLUSA and CAFA statutes together “confirm[] an overall design to
assure that the federal courts are available for all securities cases that have
national impact . . . .”262 The majority stated the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report confirmed its reading of CAFA. 263 To illustrate, the court cited the
following passages from the committee’s report:
[T]he Act excepts from . . . [its grant to district courts of
original] jurisdiction those class actions that solely involve
claims that relate to matters of corporate governance arising
out of state law . . . By corporate governance litigation, the
Committee means only litigation based solely on . . . the
rights arising out of the terms of the securities issued by
business enterprises.
The subsection 1332(d)(9) exemption to new section
1332(d) jurisdiction is also intended to cover disputes over
the meaning of the terms of a security, which is generally
spelled out in some formative document of the business
enterprise, such as a certificate of incorporation or certificate
of designations.264
The idea that Congress gave much thought to securities laws while
drafting CAFA, however, is belied by the fact that in the ninety-six-page
report the majority quotes in Cardarelli, securities class actions are
mentioned on just a single page of the report.265 While the report contains
numerous examples of purported abuses in consumer class actions Congress
intended to cure in passing CAFA, it cites no examples of securities class
actions other than to note that “Federal courts certify numerous class actions
for a broad range of claims including securities fraud, antitrust violations,
261 Estate

of Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d 25, 32 (2d Cir. 2008).

262 Id.
263 Id. (analyzing the context of the statute and its legislative history) (citing Dolan v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (citing S. Rep. No. 109–14, at 45 (2005) and recognizing the
report was issued after CAFA’s passage but finding it probative nonetheless because it was
submitted before CAFA’s passage) and (citing Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir.
2006); and (citing Lowrey v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1206, n.50 (11th Cir. 2007)
(recognizing some probative value because report was submitted before CAFA’s passage)).
264 Id. at 33.
265 See generally, S. Rep. No. 109-14, 64 (2005) (sole reference to securities class actions).
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and discrimination every year.”266 If Congress had intended through CAFA
to implicitly repeal Section 22(a), it is strange that it would not have
mentioned perceived abusive use of the class action device in securities
litigation.
Further supporting the conclusion that Congress was not intent on
expanding jurisdiction over securities class actions in CAFA is the fact that
Congress attempted to pass CAFA many times with its first iteration
introduced in 1998—the same year that Congress passed SLUSA, the law
specifically enacted to address perceived abusive use of the class-action
device in securities litigation.267 Although CAFA was not finally passed until
2005, given its predecessors’ overlap with Congress’s enactment of SLUSA,
one may reasonably conclude that in passing CAFA, Congress was
unconcerned with class actions in securities cases since it had passed the
Reform Act and SLUSA to address perceived abuses specific to securities
litigation.
Although it is always the case that courts should reconcile legal
authorities to avoid finding the authorities conflict whenever doing so is
possible, at a time when both state and federal court systems are overly
burdened,268 that obligation is even more compelling. In the context of
securities class actions brought under the 1933 Act, since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Cyan, plaintiffs have filed increasing numbers of
securities-related claims in both state and federal courts.269 Meanwhile, a
growing number of federal court cases have languished for years without

266 Id.
267 Mazzeo, supra note 17, at 1452 (citing H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. (1998) (introduced));
see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New
in Federal Jurisdiction Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1823 (2008) (characterizing the eightyear effort to get CAFA passed as “grinding”).
268 See, e.g., Alexander Mallin et al., How coronavirus is crippling the courts and raising
concerns among civil liberties advocates, (March 24, 2020, 3:06 AM) (discussing challenges faced
by both state and federal court systems in light of COVID 19 and predicting a huge increase in
federal
bankruptcy
filings
in
light
of
its
economic
consequences),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/coronavirus-crippling-courts-raising-concerns-civil-libertiesadvocates/story?id=69757862; see also Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified
Courts
Can’t
Solve
Inequality,
148(A)
DAEDALUS
128,
128
(2019),
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2352/ (“State civil courts are at the core
of the modern American justice system, and they are overwhelmed.”).
269 Securities Class Actions Filings—2020 Mid-Year Assessment, CORNERSTONE RSCH.,
18, 25, https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/2020-Securities-Class-Action-Filings2020-Midyear-Assessment (last visited Nov. 12, 2020).
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resolution. Indeed, in 2006, just over 20,000 civil cases had been pending in
federal court for more than three years.270 But by September of 2019, the most
recent time frame for which data is available, the number of civil cases
pending for more than three years grew to nearly 35,000 cases.271
In addition, filings of securities class actions continue to increase
dramatically. In 2019, plaintiffs filed 428 new securities class actions, which
is nearly double the yearly average from 1997 to 2018.272 In the two and a
half years preceding the Cyan decision, plaintiffs had filed fifty-seven new
1933 Act class actions in state court.273 In the two and a half years after the
Cyan decision, state court filings of 1933 Act class actions increased
dramatically, with plaintiffs filing eighty-seven new 1933 Act class actions
in state courts.274
There is no indication that defendants will not continue to prefer litigating
securities cases in federal court, nor is there reason to believe plaintiffs will
not continue to prefer litigating such cases in state courts, which are
considered more likely than federal courts to certify class actions.275 In
deciding Cyan, the Supreme Court eliminated one avenue defendants had
used to prevent plaintiffs from being able to litigate violations of the 1933
270 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: Report of Motions Pending More than Six Months,
Bench Trial Submitted More than Six Months, Bankruptcy Appeals Pending More than Six Months,
Social Security Appeal Cases Pending More than Six Months, and Civil Cases Pending More than
Three
Years
on
March
31,
2006,
ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/cjramarch2006_0.pdf (last visited Oct., 29, 2020)
(20,544 cases).
271 September 2019 Civil Justice Reform Act, https://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/september-2019-civil-justice-reform-act (last updated Sept. 30, 2019) (34,997 cases),
272 Securities Class Actions filings—2019 Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RSCH., 1,
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2019-Year-inReview (last visited Nov. 9, 2020) (comparing average annual class action filings from 1997 – 2018
of 215 with 2019’s class action filings of 428). Filings in the first half of 2020 dropped somewhat.
Securities Class Actions Filings—2020 Mid-Year Assessment, CORNERSTONE RSCH., 1,
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/2020-Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2020Midyear-Assessment (last visited Nov. 9, 2020). But given the COVID 19 crisis, many businesses,
law offices, and courts were closed for months.
273 Securities Class Actions Filings—2020 Mid-Year Assessment, CORNERSTONE RSCH.,
14,
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/2020-Securities-Class-Action-Filings2020-Midyear-Assessment (last visited Nov. 12, 2020) (adding cases filed from the first half of
2015 through the second half of 2017).
274 Id. at 14 (adding cases filed from the first half of 2018 through the first half of 2020)
(last visited Nov. 12, 2020).
275 See Purcell, supra note 267, at 1864–65, 1887–88.
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Act as class actions in state courts. The Cyan decision thus may provide an
incentive for plaintiffs to carve out certain claims involving offerings of
noncovered securities and file those claims solely under the 1933 Act, safe in
the knowledge that Section 22(a) prevents defendants from removing those
cases to federal court under SLUSA.
Of course, to escape SLUSA’s reach, plaintiffs’ 1933 Act claims must
concern noncovered securities. But there are a growing number of offerings
for securities that are not traded on national exchanges, especially in the word
of cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies have enjoyed explosive growth over
the last decade. Indeed, Bitcoin, which is credited as the first cryptocurrency,
was not introduced until 2009.276 The first widely known initial coin offering
in the United States, the Etherum ICO, did not occur until 2016.277 By 2017,
over 1,000 cryptocurrencies were already in circulations with new ones
continually being created and marketed to investors.278 During that year
alone, estimates suggest block chain projects raised over $5.6 billion in
funding from investors in the United States.279 Thus, it is unsurprising that
offerings of cryptocurrencies have given rise to increasing numbers of
securities class actions in recent years.280
While the Court in Cyan made clear that SLUSA did not allow removal
of 1933 cases involving noncovered securities, the opinion did not address
the other avenue defendants have pursued to remove these kinds of cases
despite Section 22(a)’s prohibition—removal under CAFA. Indeed, after
Cyan, removal under CAFA may be the only potential option for defendants
to remove these cases to federal courts where defendants expect class
certification decisions to be more stringent and to more closely adhere to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s requirements. Unfortunately for both
sides, courts are currently split as to whether CAFA’s generous removal

276 Bernard Marr, A Short History of Bitcoin & Cryptocurrency Everyone Should Read,
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/12/06/a-shorthistory-of-bitcoin-and-crypto-currency-everyone-should-read/?sh=635fa5ba3f27.
277 Id.
278 Id.; Why Aren’t Certain ICOs open to U.S. Citizens, COIN INSIDER (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.coininsider.com/why-arent-certain-icos-open-to-us-citizens/.
279 Why Aren’t Certain ICOs open to U.S. Citizens, COIN INSIDER (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.coininsider.com/why-arent-certain-icos-open-to-us-citizens/.
280 See, e.g., Owen v. Elastos Found., 438 F. Supp. 3d 187, 193–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2020);
Vanbecelaere v. YayYo, Inc., No. CV 20-7997-PA, 2020WL 5362696, at *1 (C.D. Ca. Sept. 8,
2020); Coffey v. Ripple Labs Inc., 333 F. Supp. 3d 952, 955 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Greenwald v. Ripple
Labs, Inc., No. 18-cv-04790-PJH, 2018 WL 4961767, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2018).
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provisions can circumvent the 1933 Act’s strict prohibition against removal
in cases still subject to Section 22(a).

CONCLUSION
At a time when both state and federal court systems are overly
burdened,281 confusion as to where cases may be heard is as damaging as it
has ever been. Confusion regarding the interplay between the removal
provisions in the 1933 Act and CAFA, perhaps combined with the increased
numbers of new coin offerings, encourages parallel litigation and inspires
sprawling satellite litigation over whether cases may be heard in state or
federal courts. Both the 1933 Act and CAFA have been consistently criticized
as confusing and poorly drafted. Both have spawned significant litigation
over their jurisdiction and removal provisions.
This article seeks to provide clarity on the complicated issue of how
courts should treat cases that arguably implicate both statutes. Such clarity
benefits court and litigants by saving valuable time and resources that would
otherwise be spent fighting over the procedural issue of where the cases
should be heard, rather than the substantive issues concerning whether the
plaintiffs’ claims are viable and whether defendants’ securities offerings
violated the law. Clear rules regarding whether a state or a federal court is
the proper forum in which to hear these cases will promote greater
predictability, and, of course, greater predictability benefits courts and
litigants, as well as individuals, businesses, and investors.282

281 See, e.g., Mallin, supra note 268, (discussing challenges faced by both state and federal
court systems in light of COVID 19 and predicting a huge increase in federal bankruptcy filings in
light of its economic consequences); see also Shanahan, supra note 268, at 128 (“State civil courts
are at the core off the modern American justice system, and they are overwhelmed.”).
282 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (recognizing benefits of clear, readily
appliable jurisdictional rules, even if in application in some cases such rules lead to absurd results).

